On October 26, 2022, the Kawartha Spirit, a 20 m tour vessel, touched bottom near Purcells Cove at the entrance to the Northwest Arm in Halifax Harbour. She was making about 7 knots in fog, with 54 passengers, a tour guide and 4 crew on board. No injuries or pollution were reported. Both propellers were bent and the port rudder was gone.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated. Its report, M22A0355, is short and worth reading. The TSB doesn't assign fault, and neither do I. I'm writing about it because nothing in this report is unusual. That is the point.
A chain of ordinary decisions
There's no one big mistake here. There's a string of small choices.
- The weather was discussed, and the tour went ahead. The master and lead master talked about the weather and restricted visibility. At departure, visibility was 2 km.
- The fog thickened, and the boat moved closer to shore. Visibility dropped to about 0.4 km. With the shoreline hidden, the vessel ran closer to shore than normal, about 100 m off on average. The TSB calls it an unplanned passage.
- A passenger took the wheel. Moments after a course change, a deckhand brought up a passenger who wanted to steer. The master welcomed the passenger into the wheelhouse, and the mate stepped outside to keep lookout.
- The radar and depth sounder were off. Only the AIS, chart plotter and radios were on.
- A buoy didn't match the screen. The master sighted a green buoy on the wrong side, checked the chart plotter, and couldn't find the buoy on the display. The master altered course to starboard. Less than 30 seconds later, the vessel touched bottom.
- The report came late. The master called the lead master by cellphone less than 20 minutes after the contact. The lead master reported the occurrence to Halifax Marine Communications and Traffic Services about 2 hours after it happened. The TSB notes that the master of a vessel 20 m or more is required to report this type of occurrence as soon as the master becomes aware of it.
Every one of those decisions made sense to someone in the moment. None of them was written down ahead of time.
They had an SMS. It just didn't cover this.
The company had a voluntary safety management system. According to the TSB, at the time it did not include requirements for voyage planning, route deviations, procedures for the bridge team in restricted visibility, or procedures for visitors to the wheelhouse.
That's the gap I see most often: an SMS that covers emergencies, but not the normal trip when the fog rolls in.
To the company's credit, it has since created a standard operating procedure for restricted visibility, added it to its SMS, and changed its training for new operators.
Four questions to answer in writing
If you run a small passenger vessel, answer these on paper.
- What is the planned route, and who can approve leaving it? Your skipper knows the route by heart. Write it down anyway, with the conditions that mean you change it, shorten it or cancel.
- Who may take the wheel, and when is the wheelhouse closed to visitors? A guest at the wheel can be part of a good tour. Decide when it's allowed. Fog and tight water belong on the "not now" list.
- Which navigation aids must be on and cross-checked on every trip? The TSB is plain: relying on one electronic aid, especially in restricted visibility, can lead to accidents. Cross-check with everything you have: your eyes, depth sounder, radar and chart plotter.
- Who reports an occurrence, to whom, and how fast? Name the person. Name the number. Put it on a card in the wheelhouse.
None of this needs to be complicated. It just needs to be decided before the day it matters.
Where the MSMSR comes in
The Marine Safety Management System Regulations (SOR/2024-133) require the ship manager of a Canadian vessel in Classes 1 to 5 to develop, implement and maintain a documented SMS (section 5). The TSB report noted that the regulations, then proposed, would apply to vessels like the Kawartha Spirit. If you carry passengers on a vessel under 24 m, check the class definitions in section 1. Most will land in Class 4.
For a Class 4 vessel, the regulations line up closely with my four questions:
- Your SMS must include instructions and procedures for "voyage planning, safe navigation and handling of the vessel" (paragraph 403(c)).
- It must set out "defined levels of authority and lines of communication" between shore and vessel (paragraph 402(c)).
- It must include procedures for reporting shipping casualties (paragraph 402(d)) and for reporting emergency situations (paragraph 404(d)).
- And once your SMS is in place, the vessel has to operate in accordance with it (subsection 407(2)).
That last one matters most. An SMS that describes a boat you don't actually run won't help you on the water. Write it around how your vessel really operates, then make sure the crew works that way. Transport Canada's guide, TP 15566, explains what it expects.
Get it done this winter
The off-season is the time to put your route, wheelhouse rules, navigation checks and reporting chain on paper.
If you're not sure which class your vessel is in, or what your SMS is missing, start with our Free MSMSR Vessel Class Finder. Or reach me directly at lisa@amsg.ca or 416-938-6671.
Source: Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Marine Transportation Safety Investigation Report M22A0355, and the TSB investigation page for M22A0355.